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JUSTICE BRENNAN'S GENDER JURISPRUDENCE 
by 
REBECCA KORZEC· 
INTRODUCTION 
During his thirty-four year tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice William 
Joseph Brennan, Jr. demonstrated unparalleled sensitivity to the protection of 
individual rights. l Justice Brennan's landmark opinions included Baker v. Carr,2 
Goldberg v. Kelly,3 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.4 Before Brennan, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence exalted judicial passivity by employing techniques 
for avoiding constitutional issues, such as abstention, comity, exhaustion of 
remedies and the political question doctrine.!i 
Against this background, Brennan became an active judicial voice in a 
series of innovative landmark cases, including decisions requiring federal officials 
to pay damages for violation of citizens' constitutional rights;6 authorizing federal 
courts to issue injunctions forbidding state court prosecutions under laws violating 
the First Amendment; 7 and pennitting congressional employees to sue members 
of Congress for discriminatory treatment. 8 
However, less attention has been focused on Justice Brennan's dramatic 
impact on the Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence. More than any other 
member of the Court, Justice Brennan recognized the complexity and pervasive-
ness of sex discrimination and its costs to society as a whole.9 Brennan's 
• Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., TOlenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REv. 33 (1990). 
2369 U.S. 186 (1962) (apportionment decisions are not purely political and therefore justiciable). 
3397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare as a property right proleCted by the due process clause). 
4376 U.S. 254 (1964) (established actual malice standatd in defamation actions involving public figures). 
, See, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term - Foreword, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 
40 (1961). 
6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
7 Dombrowski v. Pfisler, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
a Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
9 Nothing in Justice Brennan's background foreshadowed his commitment to equality between the sexes. 
Justice Brennan was born in 1906 in Newark, New Jersey, the second of eight children of Irish-Catholic 
immigrant parents. After atlending parochial and public schools in Newark, Brennan gradualed from the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and from Harvard Law School in 1931. Brennan 
practiced labor law before becoming a New Jersey trial judge. In 1952, he was appointed to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey. In 1956. President Eisenhower nominaled Brennan to replace Associale Justice 
Sherman Minton. McQuade & Kardos, Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy, 33 NOTRE DAME 
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opinions recognized that sex differentiation is largely cultural in origin, rather 
than based on "real" gender differences.1o As a result, Justice Brennan created 
a truly independent gender jurisprudence, eventually emerging as the architect of 
the Supreme Court's contemporary test for evaluating claims of sex-based 
discrimination. 
Understanding the significance of Brennan's contribution requires an 
appreciation of the Supreme Court's historical attitude towards sex-based 
discrimination. Before 1971, the Supreme Court unifonnly upheld governmental 
classifications based on stereotypical and traditional role differences between men 
and women. Laws routinely classified individuals by gender, treating men and 
women as occupying separate spheres. Men occupied the sphere of wage-eamer, 
family head and societal actor. Women were assigned the roles of childbearer 
and rearer, and homemaker. These roles were thought to be mandated by nature 
and biology. Since men and women perfonned different roles, they could not 
stand as equals under the law. 11 
Gender In Traditional Case Law 
Bradwell v. lllinois12 was the first case to raise a constitutional challenge 
to the different treatment of men and women. In that case, Myra Bradwell 
challenged the refusal of the State of lliinois to pennit her to practice law solely 
because she was a woman.13 The United States Supreme Court held that the 
lliinois standard did not offend the Privileges and Immunities Cause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 14 As described by Justice Bradley, "Man is, or should 
L. REv. 321 (1958); cf., Vanderbilt, New Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 43 A.B.A.I. 
526 (1957): 
For Mr. Justice Brennan the law is a living reality concerned with human beings, 
rather than a series of judicial declarations embalmed in judicial opinions. His enthusi-
asm is contagious and his ability to deal with judges and lawyers is outstanding. While 
he is keenly conscious of the fact that we live in a constantly changing world, he is 
equally aware of the fact that human nature changes very little. He is, therefore, 
instinctively inclined to preserve the essentials of all that is good in the past and to adapt 
them to the needs of the times. 
10 See, e.g., D. Rhode, Gender and Justice 63-80 (1990). 
11 See, e.g., Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, 47 N.Y.U. L REv. 1033, 1044-70 
(1972). See Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaulls on Feminist Community, 
Illinois 1869-1895, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1518, 1523-29 (1986) (Bradwell's case as an example of false 
paternalism). See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), in which the Supreme Court refused to 
issue a writ of mandamus requiring Virginia to admit to practice a woman who had already been admitted 
to the bars of the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia. The Virginia statute provided that any 
"person" admitted in any state or the District of Columbia could also be admitted in Virginia. "Person" 
was interpreted to mean "male. " 
1: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
l' Id. at 131. 
14 Id. at 139. 
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be, woman's protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of 
women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the 
law of the Creator."lS 
In Muller v. Oregon,16 the Court continued its deference to sex-based 
classifications. There, the statute at issue prohibited employing women in 
factories or laundries for more than ten hours per day.17 Three years earlier, in 
Lochner v. New York,IS the Court had invalidated a state "maximum hours" law 
for bakers, concluding that such a law was not a legitimate exercise of police 
power because it unnecessarily interfered with individual freedom of contract 19 
Nevertheless. the hours limitation for women in Muller was found valid on 
familiar paternalistic grounds: 
That woman's physical structure and the perfonnance of maternal 
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence 
is obvious. . .. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, 
she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed 
for her protection may be sustained. even when like legislation is not 
necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to 
close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and 
depends upon him.20 
The Court continued to "protect" women from earning a livelihood on the 
same basis as men in Goesart v. Cleary.21 There, the Court upheld a Michigan 
statute prohibiting the licensing of women as bartenders unless the woman was 
the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed bar or tavem.22 The Court 
did not even question the proposition that MiChigan could prohibit all women 
from worldng as bartenders. Rather, the Court focused its attention on whether 
Michigan could create an exception for the daughters and wives of male 
owners.23 In upholding the statute, the Court found a legitimate state interest in 
combatting moral and social problems, concluding that "the oversight assured 
through ownership of a bar by a bannaid's husband or father minimize hazards 
15 [d. at 141. (Bradley. J., concmring). Justice Brennan employed this quote as an example of the law's 
"paternalistic attitude" in Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
16 208 u.s. 412 (1908). 
17 [d. at 416. 
18 198 u.s. 45 (l~:'5). 
19 [d. at 64-65. 
20 208 U.S. at 420-21. 
21 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
22 [d. at 467. 
23 [d. at 466. 
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that confront a bannaid without such protecting oversight. ,,24 
Significantly, as late as 1961 the Warren Court approved sex-based 
distinctions which focused on woman as "the center of home and family life. ,,2S 
In Hoyt v. Florida,26 the Court unanimously upheld a state law which rendered 
males eligible for jury duty unless they requested an exemption, but automatically 
granted women an exemption unless they volunteered?7 In upholding the 
validity of this female exemption, the Court emphasized the centrality of woman's 
role as wife and mother "despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the 
restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of 
community life fonnerly considered to be reserved to men .... ,,28 Moreover, 
administrative convenience pennitted a broad exemption for all women rather than 
requiring a showing of actual family responsibility.29 
Indeed, all sex-based discrimination cases decided before 1971 under the 
equal protection clause, were analyzed under the standard which the Supreme 
Court employs in reviewing purely economic classifications. Under this standard, 
the "rational relationship" test, the Court displays extreme deference to legislative 
judgments respecting sex roles and classifications.30 
']A [d. 
15 Hoyt v. Rorida, 368 U.S. 57,62 (1961). 
26 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
27 [d. at 69. 
28 [d. at 62. 
29 [d. 
30 See ELY, Democracy and Distrust (1980), drawing a connection between political powerlessness and 
gender classification. See also, L. KANOWITZ, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969); 
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law, 46 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 756 (1971). The landmarlc worle 
on equal protection analysis, Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 344 (1949) remains the conceptual starting point Tusmann and TenBroek have noted that 
[here], then is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection 
of equal laws." But laws may classify. And "the very idea of classification is that of 
inequality." In tackling this paradox, the Court has neither abandoned the demand for 
equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has 
resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional gen-
erality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. 
The essence of that doctrine can be stated with deceptive simplicity. The 
constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though they 
were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are 
similarly situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a 
classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated. 
Goesart v. Gleary, supra, note 21, illustrates the degree of judicial deference accorded sex-based 
classifications before 1971. Justice Frankfurter noted: 
"Since the line ... drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the 
suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of 
male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling." 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948). 
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Reed v. Reed 31 
In 1971, the use of this traditional standard of review ended abruptly in the 
Court's decision in Reed v. Reed.32 In Reed, the Court unanimously invalidated 
an Idaho statutory scheme which established a method for the selection of 
administrators of intestate estates, requiring "males ... be preferred to females" 
between persons "equally entitled" to administer the estate.33 This starutory 
preference for men was considered mandatory, without regard to individual 
qualifications to serve as administrator.34 
The Reed Court ostensibly applied the traditional "rational relationship" 
test, inquiring whether the sex-based classification of the Idaho statute advanced 
a pennissible statutory objective.3s Admittedly, the legislative scheme promoted 
the goal of administrative convenience, reducing the workload of probate courts 
by eliminating some contests for executor.36 The critical question, however, was 
whether the mandatory preference for men advanced this legitimate state objective 
in a manner which did not offend the Equal Protection Clause.37 
The Court reasoned that giving ". . . a mandatory preference to 
members of either sex over members of the other, merely to 
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the 
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth; and whatever may be said as to 
the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice 
in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of 
sex. ,,38 (Emphasis added) 
The Reed approach is a departure from the rational relationship test of 
Goesart or Hoyt. The administrative convenience for the Idaho probate courts in 
Reed was similar, if not greater, than that of the Florida scheme in Hoyt. Clearly, 
eliminating women from the class of potential claimants could reduce the probate 
caseload. However, achieving this legitimate administrative goal of reducing the 
31 404 u.s. 71 (1971). 
32Id. The Cowtrelied on F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vitginia. 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920). Reed, 404 U.S. 
at 76. Royster held a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly cUcumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster, 253 U.S. at 415. 
33 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. 
34 Id. at 77. 
"Id. at 76. 
36ld. 
37Id. 
38 Id. at 76-77. 
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judicial caseload could not be accomplished by such impennissible, arbitrary 
means. The Idaho statute would not result in the selection of the most competent 
executors unless it were based on the assumption that women are inherently less 
capable than men in administering estates. The Court conCluded that such an 
assumption rendered the Idaho scheme arbitrary. For the first time, the Court 
demonstrated "some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor .... ,,39 It 
is against this historical background that Justice Brennan's significant contribu-
tions to the law of sex-based discrimination should be evaluated. 
BRENNAN'S GENDER DECISIONS 
Frontiero v. Richardson40 was first in the series of sex-based discrimi-
nation opinions by Justice Brennan. Frontiero involved a challenge to a federal 
statute which provided that spouses of male members of the anned services were 
automatically considered "dependents" for purposes of obtaining increased 
allowances and benefits, while spouses of female members were required to 
demonstrate dependency on their wives for over half of their support 41 With 
only one dissenter, the Court concluded that this sex-based difference violated the 
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment 42 
As author of the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that sex should 
be deemed a suspect classification requiring the highest standard of judicial 
review.43 In examining the history and effect of discrimination against women, 
Justice Brennan found that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications 
based upon race, alienage, and national origin are inherently suspect, and must 
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. ,,44 In effect, Brennan created 
an independent gender discrimination jurisprudence. 
Next, Justice Brennan addressed the rationale of the Frontiero statutory 
scheme. The government offered administrative convenience as the sole 
justification for its discriminatory scheme: Congress might find it efficient to 
create a conclusive presumption of female dependence,4s while requiring actual 
proof of male dependence. However, when pressed, the government failed to 
prove actual economic savings.46 Ultimately, Justice Brennan concluded that the 
'9 Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer EqIUll Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 34 (1972). 
40 411 U.S. 677 (1971). 
4. Id. at 679. 
4Z [d. at 691. 
43 [d. at 688 . 
.. Id. at 687-88 . 
• , [d. at 689. 
46 [d. at 686. 
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goal of administrative convenience could not justify sex-based classifications, 
which promoted "romantic paternalism" acting to "put women not on a pedestal, 
but in a cage. ,,47 
The significance of Justice Brennan's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
have sex declared a suspect classification cannot be overestimated. The Supreme 
Court treats governmental classifications based on race and national origin as 
suspect. subjecting them to strict scrutiny. For the most part, strict scrutiny 
invalidates classifications while rational relationship almost always upholds the 
governmental scheme. Professor Gunther has noted that, as a practical matter, 
this strict standard of judicial review is "fatal in fact" to a classification. 48 
Having failed to attract the necessary votes to declare sex a suspect 
classification, Justice Brennan modified his position in Craig v. Boren.49 The 
Craig Court invalidated Oldahoma statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to 
males under 21 and females under 18.50 The state argued that statistical surveys 
demonstrated a high correlation between sex and alcohol-related driving offenses 
in that 2% of males but only 18% of females aged 18-20 had such driving 
47 Id. at 684. Justice Brennan specifically asserted that what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect 
categories as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that 
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perfonn or contribute to society. As a 
result, statutoI)' distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire 
class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. 
Id. at 686 . 
.. Gunther, supra, note 39, at 8. 
In his 1975 opinion for the Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Brennan 
hinted that he would adopt a different approach to accommodate the reluctance of the other justices to 
treat sex-based classifications as inherently suspect Wiesenfeld involved a provision of the Social 
Security Act which provided survivors' benefits directly to widows having minor children in their care. 
while widowers with minor children received benefits only for their children. The Court invalidated the 
statute under FrOnliero. Id. at 642-43. Justice Brennan reasoned that both provisions assumed that the 
earnings of male workers, but not those of females, were vital to the family unit Id. at 643. Brennan 
viewed this legislative scheme as "denigrat[ing] ... the efforts of women who do work and whose 
earnings contribute significantly to their families' support. ld. at 645. To gain a consensus, Justice 
Brennan refrained from grounding his analysis on sex as a suspect classification, emphasizing Reed as 
well as Fronliero. Id. at 642-53. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), in which Justice 
Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, struck down a Social Security Act provision which granted 
a widow survivors' benefits based on her deceased husband's earnings, while permitting a widower 
benefits only if he had received at least one-half of his support from his deceased wife. Significantly, 
Justice Brennan viewed this scheme as discriminatoI)' against covered wage-earning wornen who received 
less protection for their spouses than enjoyed by similarly situated men. ld. at 206-07. (" ... the 
presumption of wives' dependency ... is ... based simply on 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations . 
. .. ) Id. at 217. 
49 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Nevertheless, Iustice Brennan held finn to the sex as suspect classification 
theory, requiring the strictest scrutiny, regardless of whether men or women were disadvantaged by the 
classifications. This analysis applied as well when the legislation was considered benign or compensatoI)' 
in nature. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351. 357 (1974) (Brennan, J.). 
so 429 U.S. at 210. 
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arrests. Sl Unpersuaded by the statistical evidence, Justice Brennan concluded 
that Oklahoma had failed to prove that "sex represents a legitimate, accurate 
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."s2 Consequently, the Oklaho-
ma legislative scheme failed to satisfy an "intennediate scrutiny" test requiring 
that sex-based classifications "must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives."s3 
Justice Brennan expressed particular concern that "[t]he very social 
stereotypes that find reflection in age differential laws ... are likely substantially 
to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics. Hence 'reckless' young 
men who drink and drive are transfonned into arrest statistics, whereas their 
female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.",54 Significantly, Craig, 
while bending to the pragmatic need to abandon the Frontiero sex-as-suspect-
classification standard, reflected Justice Brennan's conviction that sex differentia-
tion is largely culturally created.5s Under the intennediate or "mid-level" 
scrutiny developed by Brennan in Craig v. Boren, the sex-based statutory 
classification must be substantially related to achieving an important governmental 
goal.S6 Brennan created the following framework for analyzing equal protection 
challenges to statutes containing sex-based classifications: The classification can 
withstand constitutional challenge only if it is substantially related to the 
achievement of an important governmental objective.s7 Justice Brennan would 
apply this standard for classifications which discriminate against men as well as 
women. In meeting its burden, the government must demonstrate that a gender-
neutral statute would be less effective in achieving the important governmental 
goal.S8 
51 Jd. at 201. 
52 Jd. at 204. 
53Jd. at 197. See also. Rostker v. Goldberg. 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Mississippi University For Women v. 
Hogan. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (Equal protection challenge by qualified male for admission to nursing 
school denied solely because of gender). 
54 Crmg. 429 U.S. at 202 n.14. Prior to Craig. the Court had employed " ... a spectrum of standards in 
reviewing discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause." San Antonio Indep. School Dist v. 
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1.98-99 (Marshall. J .• dissenting). 
55 See Freedman. Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court. 92 YALE LJ. 913 (1983). Pr0-
fessor Freedman contrasts the approach of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart with that of Brennan and 
Marshall to sex-based discrimination. In Freedman's view, Rehniquist and Stewart focus on whether in 
a particular case there are "real" (biological) differences between men and women. On the other hand. 
Justice Brennan views sex discrimination as more pervasive and morally problematic. See also Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Wildman. The Legitimation of Sex 
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence. 63 OR. L REv. 265 (1984); 
Comment, The "Substantial Relation" Question in Gender Discrimination Cases, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 149 
(1985). 
56 429 U.S. at 197. 
51Jd. 
58 1bis approach rejects the use and perpetuation of traditional sex roles as a legitimate governmental 
purpose, creating a presumption against the validity of sex-based classifications. Justice Brennan would 
then employ a means ends analysis to detennine the actual purpose of the classification and whether that 
classification is substantially related to the legislative goal. In completing this analysis. Brennan would 
Fall, 1991] GENDER JURISPRUDENCE 323 
Justice Brennan applied the Craig intennediate standard of review in Orr 
v.Orr.59 In Orr, the Court invalidated an Alabama law which imposed the duty 
to pay alimony on men only.60 Brennan particularly objected to the Alabama 
legislation's assigning a dependent role to wives within the family, since such 
sex-role allocation no longer reflected the reality of women's participation in the 
contemporary work force.61 
Justice Brennan was less likely than other members of the Court to accept 
classifications based on the distinctive reproductive characteristics of the sexes. 
Brennan's dissent in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Countl2 County 
is a convincing example. Michael M. was prosecuted under California's statutory 
rape law, which penalizes men for engaging in sexual intercourse with females 
under eighteen.63 Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist exhibited great 
deference towards the state's justification for the statutory rape law: the 
prevention of teenage pregnancy. Rehnquist concluded that, since only females 
can become pregnant, men and women are not similarly situated "with respect to 
the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.,,64 Since the threat of pregnan-
cy sufficiently deterred young females, the legislature could create a deterrent for 
young men by imposing criminal penalties.65 
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that California had presented no evidence 
to prove that the threat of pregnancy deterred young females.66 Significantly, 
Brennan concluded that California's statutory rape law resulted from "outmoded 
sexual stereotypes" which view males as sexual aggressors.67 
Justice Brennan consistently views "protective" or "benign" sex-based 
classifications as discriminatory. In Kahn v. Shevin,68 the Court upheld a Florida 
law granting widows a $500 property tax exemption.69 Although the statutory 
ask whether sex is an accurate proxy for the characteristics related to the goal and whether a sex-neutral 
rule could be equally effective. Freedman, supra note 55 at 926. See also Ginsburg, Sex Equality and 
the Constitution, 52 TuL. L. REV. 451,468-69 (1978). 
59 440 U.S. 268.279 (1979). 
60 Id. at 283. 
611d. 
62 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
63 Id. at 466. 
64 Id. at 471. 
65 Id. at 464. 
66 Id. at 492. 
67 Id. at 496. 
61 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Ginsburg. Some Thoughls on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex. 
10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978). 
69 416 U.S. at 356. 
324 AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 25:2 
exemption had been created in 1855 on the assumption that all widows had been 
fmancially dependent on their husbands, the majority accepted Florida's argument 
that the law was intended to alleviate past economic discrimination against 
women.70 Justice Brennan dissented, finding no compelling governmental 
interest in the Florida legislative scheme.71 Justice Brennan felt that the 
difficulty with Kahn v. Shevin was that it relegated widows to a permanent, 
separate status, regardless of wealth or business experience. At the same time, 
it denied the state's "benevolence" to widowers who may be needy or unsophisti-
cated.72 As such, the Florida statutory scheme perpetuates historical sex-role 
stereotypes which ultimately disadvantage both men and women.73 
Justice Brennan's consistent attempt to invalidate most sex-based 
classifications is grounded in his view that such discrimination is a deeply-rooted, 
historicru phenomenon. For example, in Frontiero Brennan confronted the "long 
and unfortunate rustory of sex discrimination,,74 which remains "pervasive" in 
society as "discrimination against women in our educational institutions, in the job 
market. and perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.'t75 The result of 
this continuing discrimination is that all sex-based laws, even those which 
ostensibly benefit women, "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about 
the proper place of women and their need for special protection. ,,76 The 
consequence of such "protection" is that the laws are predicated on inaccurate and 
inequitable assumptions about the roles played by men and women. 
Justice Brennan dissented again in Schlesinger v. BaUard.71 There, the 
Court faced a challenge to a Federal statute subjecting a male navy officer who 
twice failed to be selected for promotion to mandatory discharge regardless of the 
length of time he had been in active service.78 Under a different statute, a 
female officer was subject to mandatory discharge only after thirteen years of 
active service without promotion.79 In upholding the regulation, the Court found 
that, because female officers were not assigned to combat duty and thus had less 
opportunity for advancement than male officers, the two groups were not similarly 
situated.so As a result, the classification was seen as compensatory rather than 
7°Jd. at 357. 
71 Jd. at 357-58 (Brennan, I., dissenting). 
n/d. 
73 Jd. at 360. 
74411 U.S. 677,684 (1971). 
1S Jd. at 686. 
76Jd. 
77 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
711 Jd. at 499 n.1. 
79 Jd. at 499-500 and n.2 
80 Jd. at 508. 
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dnscriminatory.81 The majority observed that the "longer period of tenure for 
women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women 
officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programS.',,82 Justice 
Brennan argued that because gender classification was involved, the legislation 
must be examined under the strict scrutiny standard.83 He also noted that the 
legislative history failed to demonstrate a compensatory purpose with regard to 
female officers.84 On the contrary, in Brennan's view "the legislative history 
[was] replete with indications of a decision not to give women any special 
advantage. ,,85 
Significantly, in Geduldig v. Aiello,86 Brennan dissented from the Court's 
application of the mere rational basis standard to the statutory exclusion of 
pregnancy benefits from California's disability insurance program.81 lncredibly, 
tlhe Geduldig majority insisted that the exclusion of pregnancy did not involve a 
gender-based classification, but rather a distinction between pregnant cnnd 
nonpregnant persons.1I1! Dnssenting, Justice Brennan argued that: 
]By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked 
disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard 
for disability compensation. . .. Such dissimilar treatment of men 
orund women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably 
linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.89 
Justice Brennan again assumed the role of passionate dissenteflO in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.91 The statute in1. question was concededly 
gender--neutral on its face92 in iliat it gave preference to veterans over noo-
veterans in employment. The majority concluded that the statutory scheme did 
81 [d. 
82 [d. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Congo (1967». 
83 [d. at 511 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
04 [d. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
as [d. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
07 [d. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
00 [d. at 496 n.20. 
09 [d. at 501 (Brenllen, 1., dissenting). 
!In The "intermediate tier" standard of review created by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren continues to 
he employed in various factual contexts. See. e.g., City of Oebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 
432 (1985). However, in gender-based classification cases the Court's decisions often have placed 
Brennan in the posture of dissenter. 
91 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
92 [d. at 274. 
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not constitute invidious discrimination93 even though 98% of veterans were 
male.94 On the other hand, Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in recogniz-
ing that the statute, while facially gende.-neutral, in fact, discriminated against 
women by "render[ing] desirable state civil service employment an almost 
exclusively male prerogative. 1195 
In Robens v. United States Jaycees,96 Justice Brennan enjoyed a now-rare 
position writing for the Court rather than in dissent91 Brennan faced a conflict 
between First Amendment individual liberties and anti-discrimination state laws. 
At issue was the membership scheme of the national Jaycees which limited 
regular membership to men.98 Two Minnesota chapters began accepting women 
as regular members, arguing that the Minnesota Human Rights Act mandated this 
action. The national organization alleged its First Amendment rights of speech 
and association had been abridged.99 Although Justice Brennan conceded that 
application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act would cause "incidental abridg-
ment"lOO of protected speech, such de minimis restriction was necessary to 
achieve the state's legitimate purpose in attacking invidious gender discrimina-
tion. lOl 
Privacy and Personal Autonomy 
Justice Brennan's views on privacy and personal autonomy were grounded 
in his belief that the Constitution is subject to "contemporary ratification." I02 
By this, Brennan meant that the Court must promote human dignity and personal 
autonomy as measured by changing societal needs and values, rather than by the 
93 I d. at 280-81. 
94 /d. at 270-71. 
95 Id. at 283. (Marshall, J. o dissenting). See also, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). holding that 
the Selective Service Act, which required registration of males only did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 83. Justice Brennan again dissented. 
96 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
97 Id. at 612. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 614. 
100 Id. at 628. Women have sought to gain membership in men's clubs where significant professional and 
business contacts often occur. See generally, Burns, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's 
Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HAR C.R.-C.L.L.REV. 321 (1983). 
Professor Rhode suggests a different viewpoint than Justice Brennan's. "An alternative theoretical 
framework for evaluating separatist associations should neither minimize the values at issue nor assume 
their primacy for all selective organizations. Such an approach requires a greater sensitivity to context, 
to the varying cultural functions, meanings. and consequences of particular social relationships. Rhode. 
Association and Assimilation. 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106. 124 (1986). 
101 468 U.S. at 629. 
102 Speech by Justice Brennan at Georgetown University. The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification (Oct 12. 1985). REPRINTED IN A. Mason and D. Stephenson. American 
Constitutional Law (1987). 
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Framers' original intent In fact, Brennan viewed the Framers' intent as 
essentially indiscernible, fmding it "arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we 
can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to 
specific, contemporary questions."IOJ 
Justice Brennan's dissenting opInIOn in Michael H. v. Gerald D.l04 
evinces his view on individual privacy and autonomy. Michael H. sought to 
maintain a relationship with his biological daughter although the child's mother 
was married to another man. lOS The controlling California statute established 
a conclusive presumption in favor of the paternity of the mother's husband. lOO 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that the "liberty" protected by 
substantive due process extended only to the liberty to engage in activities which 
have been protected "traditionally" from societal or state contro1.107 Since 
Michael H.'s parental interest as an "adulterous biological father" had not been 
protected by societal or constitutional tradition, Scalia found the California 
conclusive presumption constitutionally valid. lOS 
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found Scalia's interpretation so narrow as to 
destroy the doctrine of substantive due process.109 Admittedly, the legal 
"tradition" of the nation contains statutes criminalizing both abortion and the 
distribution of contraceptive devices. As a result, Brennan found Scalia's 
approach to be so limiting as to provide no real limit. llo Brennan argued that 
societal tradition is not the necessary condition to defIDing liberty which is 
protected from state action. Although recognizing the relevance of tradition, 
Brennan argued that the tradition which delineates the parameters of "liberty" is 
general, not specific.lll Therefore, the liberties protected by due process are 
embodied in the general tradition precedentially protected by the Supreme Court, 
103 Id. 
lOt 109 S. Ct 2333 (1989). 
105 Id. at 2335. 
1015 Id. 
107 Id. at 2346. 
lOS Id. at 2344. 
109 Id. at 2350-51 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). Scalia's test would invalidate the following Supreme Court 
decisions: Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept't of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841 (1990) (upholding right to die); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (up-
holding right of unmarried individuals to use contraceptive devices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (upholding right of married individuals to use contraceptive devices). See also, Tribe, 
"Commentary-The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the 
Dilemma o/Dependence," 99 HARV. LREV. 330 (1985) (arguing denial of abortion rights helps perpetuate 
hierarchical relationships in which women are subjugated). 
110 Michael H., at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
III Id. at 2350. 
328 AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 25:2 
including parenthood, contraception and reproduction.1l2 Indeed, under Justice 
Brennan's view, the tradition protecting Michael H. 's liberty interest exists in the 
Supreme Court decisions which affirmed the right of unwed fathers to parent their 
children. 113 In effect, the California conclusive presumption violated this 
Supreme Court tradition.1l4 
Justice Brennan's view concerning the personal right to choose abortion 
confmns his determination to protect individual autonomy and privacy as basic 
civil rights. In Harris v. McRae,IlS Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's 
holding that the Hyde Amendment's denial of public funding for certain 
medically necessary abortions subject to medicaid funding does not contravene 
the equal protection or liberty guarantees of the Due Process Clausesy6 
Brennan's dissent underscored his views that Roe v. Wade and its progeny 
guarantee the constitutional right to personal privacy, protecting women from 
governmental interference during the first trimester. ll7 Specifically, Brennan 
concluded that "the state must refrain from wielding its enormous power and 
influence in a manner that burden the pregnant woman's freedom to choose 
whether to have an abortion. 118 
Significantly, Justice Brennan is one of the first members of the Court to 
treat gender-related characteristics, such as pregnancy, in non-discriminatory 
terms. Justice Brennan's approach contributed in the most significant manner to 
the debate concerning the definition and desirability of equality between women 
and men. Justice Brennan rejected the concept that most sex-based differences 
are "real" and biologically detennined. 1l9 Since American society is largely 
112 [d. 
113 Id. at 2351-55. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed. 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v.illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972). 
114 Michael H., at 2355. 
m 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
116 [d. at 329. 
117 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
118 448 U.S. at 329. See also, Justice Brennan's dissent in Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 499 (1983), arguing that the statutory second physician requirement is 
overbroad where maternal health considerations required the use of procedures, such as dilation and 
evacuation, which leave no possibility of fetal survival. 
119 See e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,463 (1981) (Rehnquist, I., joining Stewart, J., concuning 
in the result); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in pertinent 
part). The "real" sex differences approach stresses gender distinctions which are "real" in the sense of 
being "natural" or "biological", such as pregnancy, menstruation orlaclation. The significant question to 
the "real" differences proponents is whether women and men are different in fact with respect to a specific 
legislative classification. See also, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion) 
(pregnancy as a "natural" deterrent to sexual intercourse for young women, but not young men). 
Classifications based on such "real" differences are often over-inclusive in that many members of each 
gender lack the reproductive characteristics defining their sex. For example, excluding all women from 
a particular workplace because of dangers to reproduction would be over-inclusive to the extent that some 
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characterized by sex differentiation, gender segregation, and gender-based 
hierarchical structures in the home, in the workplace and in the legislature, even 
facially neutral laws are likely to have a disparate impact on either men or 
women. 120 For example, seemingly neutral rules such as seniority and tenure, 
in fact discriminate against women because mothers, rather than fathers, are likely 
to intenupt their working lives to parent. 121 
Privacy, "Real" Gender Differences and Pregnancy 
Although explicit gender classifications involving pregnancy have been 
deemed constitutionally valid because only women can become pregnant, 122 the 
Court has exhibited substantial difficulty in dealing with pregnancy legislation. 
The fact that pregnancy is gender specific has raised doctrinal problems and 
inconsistencies in the decisional law. Indeed, the Court has exhibited consider-
able reluctance to treat pregnancy classifications as sex-based discrimination. 
Significantly, the Court has had considerable difficulty in even perceiving 
disparate treatment issues in pregnancy classifications. 
In Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur,123 the Court considered two 
mandatory maternity leave policies which excluded pregnant teachers from the 
classroom even though the teachers were willing and able to teach.l24 The 
circuit courts of appeals had treated the problem as one of equal protection.125 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose to strike down the policies on due process 
grounds: the policies constituted impennissible irrebuttable presumptions about 
the pregnant woman's capacity to work, unduly burdening her fundamental right 
to bear a child.126 
As previously discussed, the Court did apply equal protection analysis to 
women are infertile. 
120 See, e.g., Goode, Why Men Resist in RetlUnking the Family 131 (B. Thome ~ M. Yalour eds. 1982); 
Note, Toward a Redefinition 0/ Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487 (1981). 
121 See, e.g., Beck, The Gender Factory (1985); Liefland, Career Patterns 0/ Male and Female lAwyers. 
35 BUFF. L. REv. 601 (1986) (women lawyers act as primary childcare providers within the family); 
Weiler. The Wages o/Sex: The Uses and Limits o/Comparable Worth. 99 HARv. L. REv. 1728, 1785-87 
(1986). 
122 See Miclulel M .• 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
In 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall and Blackmun. Justices Douglas and Powell concurred, while Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rcbnquist dissented. 
I~ [d. at 645. 
125 LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Education. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (classification based on sex). 
cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd .• 474 F.2d 395,397 (4th Cir. 1973) (no sex discrimination 
present because pregnancy rules do "not apply to women in an area in which they compete with men. H). 
1211 414 U.S. at 644-48. 
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pregnancy in Geduldig v. Aiello.121 The California disability insurance scheme 
covered numerous conditions, some expensive or voluntary, which applied to both 
sexes. The scheme also covered some health conditions unique to men, such as 
circumcision and prostatitis, while excluding nonnal pregnancy and child-
bi rth. 128 The majority applied the minimum rationality standard, holding that 
the equal protection clause did not mandate the "sacrifice" of California's 
disability system.129 
Justice Brennan dissented. 130 Unlike the majority, Brennan recognized 
that pregnancy-related disabilities are truly gender-linked disabilities since they 
result from physical characteristics inextricably possessed by women.131 Justice 
Brennan accurately concluded that treating pregnancy disabilities differently than 
male sex-linked disabilities such as prostatitis constituted sex discrimination.132 
The Court continued its incredible and unworkable approach to pregnancy 
in the Title VII case, General Electric v. Gilben.133 Despite the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's promulgation of guidelines construing Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Ad34 to mandate pregnancy coverage,13S the Court denied 
relief to women whose company disability policy extended benefits for 
nonoccupational health problems, while excluding pregnancy.136 Again, the 
majority distinguished between pregnant and unpregnant persons, stressing the 
fact that pregnancy is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.,,131 
IZ7 See supra note 86 and accompanying text The GeduJdig majority dismissed the gender discrimination 
issue in a footnote, 417 U.S. at 496-97. (,1ack of identity between the excluded disability 
and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The 
California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but 
merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. . .. The 
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While 
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes"). 
128 Gedu/dig at 501. 
129 [d. at 494. 
130 [d. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
131 [d. at 501. 
132 [d. at 501. 
133 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
135 The' Court found the statute's "plain meaning" did not mandate pregnancy coverage. 429 U.S. 125, 
145; cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860-65 (1984). 
136 [d. at 145. 
m [d. However, vasectomy, which is also "voluntary" was covered by the General Electric plan. See 
Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1532, 1561-63 (1974). 
Eventually, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") of 1978, amending Title VII to 
include pregnancy classifications within the definition of sex discrimination. See also, Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) ("discrimination based on a 
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex"). 
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Naturally, Justice Brennan dissented.138 Brennan rejected the majority's 
insistence that pregnancy is a "gender-free" classification.139 Significantly, 
Brennan argued that the majority's analysis "proves to be simplistic and 
misleading" .140 Emphasizing the fact that all other sex-specific disabilities were 
covered by the plan, Justice Brennan concluded that excluding pregnancy 
disadvantaged women in the workplace. 141 The General Electric plan, therefore, 
discriminated against women by encouraging outmoded stereotypes of women in 
the workplace.142 
As such, Justice Brennan recognized that historical and societal attitudes 
towards women and pregnancy, rather than "real" gender differences created legal 
disabilities for women.143 Brennan's analysis promotes gender equality by 
recognizing that the injury of sex discrimination rests in being deprived of 
political, legal, or educational opportunity merely because one is a woman or a 
man. l44 The genius of Justice Brennan's gender jurisprudence as it related to 
pregnancy is that he demanded the law abandon negative stereotypes in favor of 
equal treatment for women and men. 
"Benign" Gender Discrimination 
Justice Brennan generally opposed sex-based classifications which had the 
"benign" purpose of "compensat[ing] female beneficiaries as a group for the 
economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves 
and their families. ,,145 As previously discussed, Justice Brennan routinely 
138 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146. 
1391d. at 147. 
140 Id. at 152. 
141 Id at 155. 
142 Id. at 159-60. 
1431d. 
144 Feminist writers disagree fundamentally on the question of whether pregnancy requires "special" 
treatment Minimi:ling the legal consequences of physical differences between women and men has been 
an accepted methodology under equal protection analysis. This "equal treatment" or "assimilationist" 
model treats man as the standard by which equality is defined. However, this approach may prove 
unworkable as applied to pregnancy classifications. See generally, Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. Iu. 
L. REV. 39 (1985); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L REV. 955 (1984). Treating 
women and men as similarly situated on issues of pregnancy and reproduction may, in fact, violate equal 
protection considerations in that women and men are not the same for reproductive purpose. Simply 
stated, "pregnancy ... and creation of another human being are special -- very special. Women have these 
experiences. Men do not" Law, supra at 1007. See also Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and 
Equal TreatmenllSpecial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y. U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984); MacKinnon, 
Introduction to Symposium on Sexual Harassment, 10 CAP. U. L REv. I. VI. n.21 (1981). 
145 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1978) (rejecting this "benign" purpose as illegal 
discrimination). cf Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct 1442 (1987), where Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, upheld a voluntarily-adopted affirmative action plan under Title VII which 
permitted gender to be considered as one factor in jobs, such as dispatcher, in which women are under-
represented significantly. Professor Sullivan argues that voluntary affirmative action programs should not 
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rejected remedial measures grounded in the "romantic patemalism"l46 which 
actually perpetuates traditional sex roles. Brennan feared that even those gender-
based classifications which government considered "an affinnative step toward 
alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination against women,,147 
ultimately promoted the very gender stereotypes which foster gender inequali-
ty.148 
As previously discussed, Kahn v. Shevin,149 is an example of "benign" or 
remedial legislation endorsed by the Court, but condemned by Justice Bren-
nan.lSO In Kahn, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, upheld an 1885 
Florida statute granting all widows a limited property tax exemption. lSI 
Although the 1855 enactment date belies the legislative intent of "alleviating the 
effects of past economic discrimination against women", Justice Douglas 
explicitly adopted Florida's rationale. Justice Douglas reasoned that "[w]hether 
from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated 
culture, the job marlc.et is inhospitable to the women seeking any but the lowest 
paid jobs. ,,152 Citing data demonstrating that the median income of working 
women was less than sixty percent of the male median, Justice Douglas concluded 
that: 
The disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the 
widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his 
spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly 
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, 
because of her fOImer economic dependency, she will have fewer 
skills to offer. lS3 
require the same depee of judicial suspicion as court - ordered remedies. Sullivan. The Supreme Court, 
1986 Term -- Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's AjJirmillive Action Cases. 100 HARV. L. 
REv. 78. 96-97 (1986). cf. Days. Fullilove. 96 YALB L.l. 451. 483-84 (1987). arguing that voluntary 
affinnative action programs must be justified by more extensive demonstrations of past discrimination 
because "more than good motives should be required when government seeks to allocate its resources by 
way of an explicit racial classification system. It must be shown that such a system is responsive to 
findings of racial discrimination. is designed to redress that problem. and is employed only as long as is 
necessary to achieve its remedial objective." Id. 
146 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313. 320 (1977) (per curiam). 
147 Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974) (Brennan. 1 .• dissenting). 
141 See also Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495. 520-21 (1976): "Habit, 
rather than analysis. makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female .... But 
that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no rational relationship - other than pure prejudicial 
discrimination - to the stated pwpose for which the classification is being made." 1d. 
149 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
130 [d. at 358. 
151 1d. at 355. 
152 [d. at 353. 
153 [d. at 354. 
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Although Justice Douglas' sensitivity to the peIVasiveness of economic 
discrimination against women is commendable, it fails to justify the establishment 
of a permanent, separate legal classification for all widows, regardless of their 
actual wealth, business experience, or gender victimization Indeed, the legislative 
classification in Kahn promotes the outmoded stereotypes of women which create 
and perpetuate worlcplace inequality. Essentially, Justice Douglas undermines his 
own sensitivity to gender discrimination by justifying the continued use of 
discriminatory sex-based classifications to remedy past inequities. 
Justice Brennan understood this paradox. He insisted that legislative 
classifications (such as the one in Kahn) adversely affecting men should be 
subjected to the same scrutiny as sex-based laws discriminating against women. 
Significantly, Justice Brennan opposed most sex-based classifications as endorsing 
sex discrimination which is both constitutionally and morally problematic. 
Although Justice Brennan acknowledged the nation's "long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination,lS4 his gender jurisprudence explicitly rejected 
"benign" laws which burdened men in the name of remedying discrimination 
against women. Implicitly, Justice Brennan recognized that such "benign" 
legislative schemes actually embrace the outmoded stereotypes which relegate 
women to a different, unequal sphere. Ultimately, such remedial or benign 
classifications place women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. 
As a result, Brennan's gender jurisprudence contributes significantly to the 
essential debate concerning the meaning of gender eqUality. Rejecting the 
unreflective biologic determinism permeating most sex-based classifications, 
Brennan sought to replace them with gender-neutral alternatives. Accordingly, 
Justice Brennan drafted the plurality opinion in Califano v. Gold/arb.iSS There, 
the Court invalidated a Social Security provision providing sUIVivor benefits to 
widowers only on a showing of substantial reliance on the deceased wife's 
income, while paying benefits to all widows, regardless of economic depen-
dence.1S6 The dissenters, led by Justice Rehnquist, were troubled by the fact 
that male litigants were able to invalidate legislation on the basis of sex-based 
discrimination without demonstrating that men are historically, economically, or 
politically disadvantaged. 1S7 Indeed, most of the benign discrimination cases 
brought to date have been instituted by males seeking "advantaged" treatment as 
154 411 U.s. 677,687. 
u, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
136 Id. at 217. 
157 Craig, 429 U.S. at 218-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist has argued consistently that 
men are not historical victims of economic or political discrimination. Therefore, men, unlike women, 
are not "in need of the special solicitude of the courts." Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
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women. ISS These men did not want preferential treatment to be termina-
ted-rather, they wanted the preferential treatment extended to themselves. In this 
respect there is no analog between "benign" or remedial racial legislation and 
remedial gender legislation. In racial discrimination legislation, the minority 
group seeks only one goal: attainment of the status accorded for white males. 
On the other hand, gender discrimination litigation follows two themes: 159 
women seek to be treated like men in the workplacel60 and men seek to be 
treated like women in the area of personal or family life.161 
CONCLUSION 
It is virtually impossible to overestimate Justice Brennan's impact on the 
Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence. Although Brennan was unable to forge 
a majority to treat sex as a suspect classification, his attempts to create such an 
analytical framework helped the Coun emerge from decades of paternalism and 
discrimination. 
Justice Brennan once stated: 
[T]he ultimate question must be, what do the works of the text 
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in 
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and 
gone, but in adaptability of its great principles to cope with current 
problems and current needs. 162 
Justice Brennan deserves great credit for crafting a unique, far-reaching 
gender jurisprudence. His greatness is not only that he was creative and 
courageous, but that he urged both the Court and society to be creative and 
courageous, as well. To all familiar with his gender jurisprudence, Justice 
Brennan shall be remembered as one of the most innovative protectors of equal 
treatment before the law. 
lSi See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (male seeking "mother's benefits" as surviving 
parent); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (male seeking overturn of State law permitting alimony awards 
only to women); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (male seeking worker 
compensation benefits provided only to widows). 
159 Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 UNlv. ILL. L REV. 39, 45-47,75-77 (1985). 
160 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Turner v. Department of Employment 
Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
161 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
162 See Brennan, supra, note 102, at 610. 
